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
COMMENTS: Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526 SEC 3.3(b) 54X5

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE 3 TOEC 2437

OKAY TO RELEASE AS REMOTED : W/CIA CONCURPENCE



- 3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.
- 4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.
- 5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.
- 6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
- 7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

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To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either

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recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

- 5. Cuban Exile Forces The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fight" under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups. Additional Policy approval is required.
- 6. <u>Infiltration/Exfiltration</u> The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:
 - a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.
 - b. Submarines and other naval craft.
 - c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

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V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

- 1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.
 - a. Site A commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

c. Site C - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

- a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.
 - b. Submarine radio broadcasts "Voice of Free Cuba"
- c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.
- d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station.
- e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft

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for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

- A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.
- B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba.
 - C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.
 - D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.
- E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.
 - F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.
- G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.

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- H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.
- I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.
- J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."
- K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.


B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 1963 - \$40,000,000

Fiscal Year 1964 - \$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis.)

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- 2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
- 3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.
- 4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.



- 6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
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